Cyber Competition

Blue Team Report

By

Kranthi Kumar Manda The University of Tampa

About Competition:

In CYB 660 – Penetration Testing course, we had a cyber competition where two teams participated. Red teamers attempted to attack the Windows server, while blue teamers like me defended using various techniques. Although this competition favored the red teamers, given the nature of the Penetration Testing course, I applied my best efforts to safeguard assigned host and server throughout this competition.

Introduction:

As a blue team, our primary goal is to defend our systems. To achieve this, we dedicated our efforts to securing them comprehensively. Understanding that effective security requires identifying vulnerabilities, we initiated a process of attacking our systems to gain insights into the overall security posture. During this exploration, we discovered several potential points of exploitation and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious actors. These vulnerabilities were like fruits ready for hackers to pluck. In response, we took proactive measures to enhance our system's security. Our security measures included actions such as removing unnecessary users, closing unused ports, and updating outdated services and software. Through these deliberate steps, we successfully minimized the attack surface, making it more challenging for potential threats to compromise our systems.

Planning:

Our plan involved collecting information, such as the number of users and their access levels. We aimed to identify potential risks specific to Windows 2008. We also planned to stop or disable unnecessary services, prioritizing based on the level of risk. Additionally, we planned to conduct patch management to address vulnerabilities. Lastly, we intended to thoroughly analyze and monitor the system logs using Suricata IDS.

Cyber Defense Work:

As a blue team (Group3), we initiated the process of securing the Windows 2008 machine by implementing various known methods. Initially, we accessed the system using the default credentials 'vagrant: vagrant'. Subsequently, we created new admin user accounts for our team's use and promptly removed any unnecessary user accounts.

Additionally, we enhanced security by updating the passwords for the 'Administrator' and 'Guest' users with strong 12-character long passwords.

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To identify the open ports on the host IP, we conducted an Nmap scan. The results revealed several open ports with associated running services.

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Notably, we observed that the firewall was initially turned off. Taking action on it, we activated the firewall and proceeded to configure inbound rules. In this step, we created rules to close all unnecessary ports, while ensuring that ports 80, 443, and 445 remained open as instructed.



We conducted an Nmap scan using Vulners scripts, focusing on identifying vulnerabilities. We discovered that on port 80, the HTTP service is running with the version Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5, which is vulnerable. To mitigate this, we removed the HTTP server header. While this action won't cause any issues, it prevents attackers from seeing the service version and header.



We also installed Microsoft Security Essentials and 'Calmwin' anti-virus software to mitigate the risk of web application vulnerabilities, such as brute force and common injection attacks.



Additionally, we identified a vulnerability in TLS certificate 1.0 and promptly updated it to the latest version, TLS 1.3. We added the updated certificates to the protocols in the Windows Registry Editor. We identified a vulnerability in the Apache Tomcat server on port 443 due to its outdated version. Addressing this issue became a priority, and we successfully updated the Apache Tomcat server to enhance its security.





Since Suricata IDS didn't function properly for our team, we opted to install Snort IDS on the Windows 2008 machine. We configured Snort rules to generate alerts for specific HTTP requests and to notify us of any port scans on the system. Additionally, we implemented an account lockout policy, essentially a rate-limiting measure, to decrease the number of failed login attempts.



Lessons learned:

Working together as a team proved to be essential in the cybersecurity world. We learned the importance of effective communication and coordination. The practical application of security measures, such as installing antivirus software, activating firewalls, and implementing countermeasures, provided us with real-world experience in Strengthening a system against potential cyber threats. Through our defending process, we learned to identify and understand various attack surfaces within our system. This knowledge was crucial in developing effective defensive strategies to minimize vulnerabilities. Also, defending against common cyberattacks like SSH brute force, command line injection, and web application attacks allowed us to put theoretical knowledge into practice. We realized the importance of continuous monitoring and adaptation in the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity. By utilizing tools like Suricata.

Challenges faced:

Initially, we struggled with lack of knowledge about blue teaming, especially when it came to understanding Windows Server. Installing different software and a vulnerability scanner proved to be quite challenging. Additionally, after closing unnecessary ports using firewall inbound rules, they didn't function properly for a long period. Configuring Suricata posed a significant challenge for our team, despite numerous attempts and online tutorials, the application kept crashing. Consequently, we faced difficulties in monitoring and analyzing logs, that stopped our ability to effectively track and respond to potential threats from the attacking team.